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A B S T R A C T
Why do non-state armed groups forcibly recruit civilians? To address this
question I develop a conceptual framework distinguishing voluntary, coerced
and forced recruitment. I then compare the recruitment tactics employed by
‘Mai-Mai’ militias and the RCD-Goma rebel group in the Democratic Republic
of Congo (DRC) in order to inductively develop a theory explaining why
groups with different initial economic and social endowments resort to force.
This comparison draws on interviews with  former militia members and
 former members of RCD-Goma. The theory suggests that forced recruitment
is most likely to occur when non-state armed groups experience manpower
deﬁcits and when accountability (to local communities, government sponsors
and/or the international community) is low. High levels of popular support will
not necessarily prevent recourse to force under these conditions, but may mean
that force is less necessary because voluntary and coerced recruits come forward
to ﬁll manpower gaps.
I N T R O D U C T I O N
From the vast literature on recruitment we know that there are myriad
possible reasons why individuals take up arms and ﬁght in civil wars.
Grievance and avarice are two of the most prominent explanations,
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although theorists have also pointed to the role of community
pressures, emotional rewards, protection from indiscriminate violence,
and coercion and/or force. Much of the recruitment literature, and
particularly scholarship on the greed-grievance debate, tends to assume
that one logic of participation accounts for mobilisation in civil war and
that this initial, single motivation remains constant over the course of
a conﬂict (Weinstein ; Kalyvas : ). Likewise much of the
macro-level literature on civil war duration relies on the assumption that
the strategic interaction between rival actors and the population has no
impact on the evolution of a civil war, or on the reasons why civilians
decide to join armed groups (Kalyvas : ). As a result of these
assumptions we know little about why armed groups with economic
endowments (such as natural resources or support from a foreign
patron) may eventually resort to forced recruitment rather than
continuing to attract recruits through the prospect of pecuniary rewards
(Weinstein , ). Similarly the literature gives no indication
of why groups with social endowments (such as shared identities and
beliefs) may also resort to forcible recruitment tactics.
It is particularly difﬁcult to address these questions given that the
current academic and policy-based literature does not provide a clear
conceptualisation of what constitutes forced, as opposed to coerced or
purely voluntary recruitment. Instead, scholars have noted that: ‘notions
of “voluntary” [recruitment] are problematic in a context of ongoing
conﬂict . . . [when] young people are often left to choose the least
worse of a series of bleak possibilities’ (Seymour : ; see also Wille
: ). Authors discussing recruitment in Angola, Mozambique
and Liberia have also had difﬁculties disentangling voluntary and
coercive recruitment (see Honwana : ; Pugel : ; Boas
& Hatloy : –).
In what follows I conceptualise forced, coerced and voluntary
recruitment and theorise the conditions under which non-state armed
groups are likely to adopt each type of recruitment strategy. This theory
is drawn inductively from a comparison of recruitment into non-
state armed groups in the DRC between  and , including
recruitment into local defence (‘Mai-Mai’) militias and into the rebel
group Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD), which later
became known as RCD-Goma. These groups had very different initial
endowments: while RCD had economic endowments (and few social
endowments), local defence militias in the Kivu provinces had social
(but initially few economic) endowments. In contrast to existing theories
which assume that economic and social endowments remain constant
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(Weinstein , ), I examine how recruitment strategies alter in
response to changes in these endowments, and in particular, to changes
in popular support, accountability and manpower deﬁcits.
A B R I E F H I S T O R Y O F C O N F L I C T I N T H E D R C
Ceded by King Leopold II, the country later known as Zaire and then
as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) became a Belgian colony
on  November . The fertile soils of the Kivu highlands in eastern
Congo soon attracted European settlers who were keen to proﬁt
from export-oriented plantation agriculture. To provide labour for the
plantations, beginning in  Belgian administrators began to import
workers from neighbouring Rwanda. Rwandophones (known as
‘Banyarwanda’) were present in eastern Congo long before colonisation,
however the arrival of this new wave of Hutu and Tutsi immigrants
sparked tensions with native inhabitants (including the Nande, Hunde
and Nyanga) who saw much of their customary land taken and settled
by the new arrivals.
Tensions between natives and Rwandophones over land rights,
citizenship and political representation became violent in late 
as the Banyarwanda rose up to ﬁght Hunde and Nande communities
in North Kivu (Mararo : ). Meanwhile in South Kivu, a Tutsi
Banyarwanda community (later known as the ‘Banyamulenge’) found
itself drawn into another conﬂict – the  eastern (or ‘Simba’)
rebellion. The Banyamulenge sided with the Armée Nationale Congolaise
(ANC) and, after helping the government to defeat the Simba rebels,
were rewarded with access to land when the former general of the ANC,
Joseph Mobutu, became president in November . In reaction,
traditional authorities from native communities began calling into
question the citizenship of the Banyamulenge. Banyarwanda in North
Kivu also began purchasing large tracts of land as a result of new laws
granting citizenship to the Banyarwanda (in ) and legalising private
ownership (in ). As a result of these changes Banyarwanda acquired
roughly  per cent of the former European plantations in Masisi and
Rutshuru territories (North Kivu) and ‘native’ communities became a
demographic minority increasingly resentful of the Rwandophones they
perceived as ‘foreigner occupiers’ (Tsongo  in Pottier : ).
On  June , and in the spirit of a policy of authenticité, Mobutu
repealed the  citizenship law. This left both Banyarwanda and
Banyamulenge potentially unable to vote and, with uncertain land
tenure, faced with the prospect of being run off their land by native citizens.
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The campaign to exclude Rwandophones from political power
continued throughout the s and early s with the systematic
exclusion of these communities from local and legislative elections
(Stearns : –). In North Kivu, tensions eventually erupted into
violence between Banyarwanda and native communities during a period
of electoral build-up in early . During this communal violence,
native communities formed local defence militias (known as ‘Mai-Mai’).
These militias contained veterans of the earlier Simba rebellion and
often used magic water (mai) and other potions (dawa) to protect their
members from harm.
Matters became worse when, following the  genocide in
Rwanda, roughly · million Rwandan Hutus crossed into North and
South Kivu (Ndikumana & Kisangani : ). Within this refugee
movement were Hutu genocidaires and former Rwandan soldiers who
went into refugee camps in areas traditionally home to the Congolese
Tutsi Banyamulenge. Native ethnic groups subsequently colluded with
the Hutu genocidaires in an attempt to settle their score with, and drive
out, the Banyamulenge. In an attempt to gain support from these native
communities, Mobutu’s regime provided weapons to the Rwandan Hutu
and, on  April , stripped all Banyamulenge and Banyarwanda
of their Zairian citizenship (Wright : ; Kisangani : ). A
little over a year later, the deputy governor of South Kivu ordered the
Banyamulenge to leave Zaire. The Banyamulenge refused to leave, and
turned to Rwanda for help.
At this time, Rwanda’s Tutsi-led government was trying to deal
with cross-border attacks launched by the Hutu genocidaires from
refugee camps in Zaire. The coalescence of Banyamulenge and
Rwandan interests prompted the latter to create the Alliance des Forces
Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo (AFDL). The AFDL rebel group
ousted Mobutu with support from local Mai-Mai militias and installed
Laurent Kabila as president of the newly renamed DRC. Relations
between Kabila and his Rwandan backers soon began to deteriorate
however, and the highly visible presence of Rwandans in the DRC’s
national army and government led Kabila to worry that he was perceived
as a mere tool of Rwandan interests (Reyntjens : ). In an
attempt to increase his internal legitimacy, Kabila ordered all Rwandan
and other foreign military to leave the DRC on  July .
In reaction, Rwanda supported a military effort to replace Kabila with
someone who would better help to secure Rwanda’s western border.
Together Rwanda and Uganda formed a new armed group known as
the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD) which announced
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its leadership on  August  (Prunier : ). RCD aimed to
remove President Laurent Kabila, who was accused of corruption and
tribalism (Turner : ).When RCD split in May , the original
RCD became known as RCD-Goma while its splinter group was referred
to as Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Kisangani-Mouvement de
Liberation (RCD-K/ML). Local Mai-Mai militias fought on the side of the
DRC government against RCD-Goma, which was widely perceived
as either a Rwandan stooge or a ‘Tutsi dominated occupation’ (Tull
: ). While some members of the Banyarwanda Hutu community
supported RCD-Goma, others formed a Mai-Mai militia known as
Mai-Mai Mongol and fought on the same side as native local defence
militias including Mai-Mai Simba, Mai-Mai Jackson, Mai-Mai Kifuafua,
Mai-Mai Nyabiondo and Mai-Mai Kasikila (Stearns : ).
Although the RCD-Goma war eventually ended in  a new
rebel group emerged during the subsequent peace process. The
Congrès National pour la Défense de la Peuple (CNDP) was led by Laurent
Nkunda, backed by Rwanda, and fought for the protection of the
Banyamulenge and the Banyarwanda Tutsi (ICG : ). Native
militias soon re-emerged to counter what they perceived as yet another
foreign threat. One of these armed groups, the Patriotes Résistants
Congolais – Forces Armées Populaires (PARECO), was a coalition of Mai-Mai
militias established on  March . Although technically under the
overall command of General Sikuli Lafontaine (a prominent Mai-Mai
commander during the RCD war), PARECO combined disparate
elements under the control of separate commanders. While
Lafontaine controlled PARECO’s Nande faction, PARECO’s Hunde
wing was led by General Janvier Karairi Bwingo, and PARECO’s Hutu
faction by General Hassan Mugabo.
Representatives from CNDP, PARECO and several other Mai-Mai
militias attended the Goma Peace Conference in early  and signed
the Acts of Engagement. However, General Janvier’s PARECO-Hunde
faction refused to implement the agreement, arguing that the
Congolese authorities could not guarantee the security of land tenure
for the Hunde community (UN , para. ). This faction formed the
new militia, Alliance des Patriotes pour un Congo Libre et Souverain (APCLS)
in April .
E X I S T I N G T H E O R I E S O F R E C R U I T M E N T
There are many theories of recruitment in the literature on revolution,
protest and civil war. In Table I, I summarise the seven main theories
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and then brieﬂy discuss each in turn. Although much of this work has
accounted for participation in rebel groups, recent work suggests that
these explanations also account for participation in militia groups that
ﬁght in defence of the state (Humphreys & Weinstein ; Peters
: ).
One of the most prominent explanations for recruitment into
armed groups in recent years has been the idea that those who ﬁght
do so voluntarily because they are motivated by greed (Collier ;
Collier & Hoefﬂer , ). Taking a narrow version of the greed
thesis suggests that individuals will enlist when the beneﬁts of
membership in an armed group exceed the costs. Consequently, when
armed groups have access to economic endowments, such as natural
resources or support from a foreign patron, it should be possible to
attract new recruits with pecuniary rewards derived from these
endowments (Weinstein , ). The greed thesis has been the
dominant narrative used to account for the onset and continuation
of armed conﬂict in the DRC since the late s (Autesserre ).
A series of reports produced at that time by European NGOs, Congolese
research institutes and later by the United Nations Panel of Experts
highlighted that rebel and militia groups in the DRC were ﬁnancing
their military activities through the illegal trade, taxing and looting of
resources, including coltan and cassiterite (UN ; Global Witness
).
The dominant greed thesis has evolved over the years with proponents
now less focused on greedy motivations than on the opportunity costs
for potential recruits (Collier et al. ). From this perspective,
rebellion occurs where it is feasible, or more speciﬁcally, where it is
possible to draw on a pool of recruits who have little to lose by joining,
perhaps because they are without school or income. With the switch
TA B L E I
Theories explaining individual participation in armed conﬂict
Mechanism Perspective
Economic beneﬁts outweigh costs Political economy (greed)
Low opportunity costs Feasibility
Individuals are angry and aggrieved Grievance
Shared beliefs, peer assurance Strong communities
Dignity, patriotism Emotional in-process beneﬁts
Insecurity Protection
Force Force
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to opportunity cost arguments, the greed perspective begins to overlap
with a large body of work in political science on grievances as a cause
of rebellion (Gurr ). Individuals who are unable to go to school
may willingly join a rebel group because they have low opportunity costs,
but they may also voluntarily sign up because they are frustrated, angry,
and aggrieved about their inability to receive an education. The same
can also be said for individuals who are unemployed or who earn too
little to make ends meet.
Traditionally, the grievance perspective has involved the study of a
set of preconditions which lead to the build up of frustration over time
and, eventually, to aggression against the established order. Some earlier
work on recruitment in the DRC follows this approach, suggesting
that a combination of pre-existing grievances, low opportunity costs
and greedy motivations account for recruitment in the early s
(Van Acker & Vlassenroot ; Jourdan ). These accounts start
by pointing to the aforementioned  law that legalised private
ownership and suppressed customary land rights. This legal change
meant that land became concentrated in the hands of a new class of
urban Congolese entrepreneurs and that an agricultural labour surplus
emerged, consisting of young men aggrieved by their inability to access
land, education, or alternative sources of work. By these accounts,
recruitment provided a means of expressing frustration but was also
an attempt to generate income in a situation in which there were
few ‘alternatives to a situation of acute deprivation’ (Van Acker &
Vlassenroot : ).
The literature also points to a second, less noted mechanism in
which new grievances are generated and/or opportunity costs are driven
down, not by preconditions, but by ongoing war (Azam , ).
During times of war civilians are subject to pillage, rape, killings and
other forms of mistreatment by armed groups which either occupy, or
attempt to occupy, territory. Indeed civilians are more often victims of
current civil wars than combatants (Azam : –). Where this
idea has been mentioned in the literature it has been associated with the
observation that armed groups in the DRC have looted their civilian
supporters in order to lower their opportunity costs to participation
(Azam ). Rather than suffer pillage, some civilians may then decide
to join the pillagers. Conversely however, the literature on militias such
as the Mai-Mai in the DRC and the Kamajors in Sierra Leone suggests
that civilians who are looted or otherwise adversely affected by rebel
groups may react by joining opposing local defence militias (Humphreys
& Weinstein ). This differs from traditional grievance theories
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in that civilians do not ﬁght against the previously established order,
but instead, for restoration of the status quo.
In addition to the aforementioned reasons of grievance, greed and
opportunity costs, authors have also argued that recruitment in the
DRC has been a way for marginalised individuals to ‘renegotiate and
improve their social status’ (Jourdan : ). This argument is
particularly prevalent with regard to participation in local Mai-Mai
defence militias (rather than rebel groups): ‘With few prospects,
association with Mai-Mai is seen by some young people as a means of
enhancing their status within the community’ (CSUCS : ). Status
has long been part of explanations accounting for collective action,
particularly in the theoretical literature linking community ties to
recruitment (Taylor ; Petersen ). From this perspective, when
communities are ‘strong’ (i.e. characterised by shared beliefs and
values, generalised reciprocity, and direct and many-sided relationships
between members) community members may feel pressured into
participation because of a norm of fairness. The impact of this norm is
likely to be particularly pronounced if community members interact
with a high number of participants (Petersen ). These participants
may also attempt to actively persuade those who opt to stay on the
sidelines to ‘do their bit’. In this scenario, community members who
ﬁght are likely to be rewarded with social status but also to be reassured
by the idea of safety in numbers. In contrast, the minority of remaining
non-participants are likely to face social sanctions in the form
of contempt from their peers.
The theoretical literature linking community dynamics to mobilis-
ation also suggests that differences in the levels of emotions (such as the
depth of resentment) felt by community members also explains why
some community members participate (and do not participate) in
armed conﬂict (Petersen : ). This argument aligns with the
emotional in-process beneﬁts perspective, which suggests that indivi-
duals sometimes ﬁght because they take pleasure in asserting their
dignity and deﬁance (Wood ). This perspective has not received
explicit mention in the literature on recruitment in the DRC but seems
plausible given the clear link between grievances (both pre-existing and
endogenous) and the emotional satisfaction that can be derived from
attempts to remedy these grievances (Gurr : ).
An additional theory of recruitment turns attention away from
emotional concerns to matters of protection (Kalyvas & Kocher
). This theoretical argument suggests that states may unleash
violence which targets segments of the population based on certain
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characteristics (age, sex, locale, ethnicity, etc.) rather than actual
behaviour (for example, supporting the rebels versus not supporting
the rebels). Consequently, individuals may join armed groups because
recruitment provides protection from this kind of indiscriminate
violence and, crucially, more protection than remaining a civilian. The
protection argument has been advanced to explain recruitment in
the DRC with authors asserting that ‘once the conﬂict has started the
escalation of violence often forces young people to enrol en masse given
that in a situation of widespread insecurity, enrolment is sometimes the
only alternative to death’ (Jourdan : ).
Finally, it should also be noted that while there is little theoretical
literature on forced recruitment (an exception is Beber & Blattman
) there is much anecdotal evidence of the practice by rebel and
militia groups in the DRC, often concerning abductions from villages,
schools and marketplaces (see HRW ; CSUCS ).
V O L U N T A R I S M , C O E R C I O N A N D F O R C E
In this section I conceptualise voluntary, coerced and forced recruit-
ment and propose a classiﬁcation of the theories discussed above within
these conceptual categories (Table II).
Drawing on existing work on coercion in the political theory
literature, I argue that coerced recruitment occurs when one agent
(Agent A) threatens another (Agent B) with a sanction if refusing to
enlist. There are two necessary and jointly sufﬁcient components to this
deﬁnition (Bayles : ). First, the existence of an interpersonal
threat, posed by Agent A, which pertains to recruitment – ‘join, or else
I’ll . . .’ – and second, the existence of a sanction which is applied if Agent
B fails to comply with Agent A’s demand. As I present it here, coercion
can be associated only with harms and not with beneﬁts in order
TA B L E I I
Theories of recruitment in terms of voluntarism, coercion and force
Voluntary recruitment Coerced recruitment Forced recruitment
Political economy (greed) Protection Abduction
Feasibility (pre-existing low
opportunity costs)
Endogenous grievances and/or
lowered opportunity costs
Threat of death for
refusal
Pre-existing grievances
Emotional in-process beneﬁts
Strong communities
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to separate it from existing theories linking positive selective incentives
to voluntary recruitment.
In the aforementioned deﬁnition, coercion involves the voluntary
action of the person being coerced in that Agent B can choose to either
comply with Agent A’s demand or receive a sanction. Just as individuals
have different pain thresholds, individuals will have different limits
when it comes to coercion. What may be coercive for one civilian may be
not so coercive for another. In the formulation I present here, if the
potential sanction is so severe as to remove virtually all choice from the
decision, this qualiﬁes as forced recruitment. The implication is that
coercion is a matter of degree, with force at the upper bound.
A straightforward, yet somewhat extreme illustration of forced recruit-
ment is when a combatant holds a gun to the head of a civilian and
threatens ‘enlist or be killed’.
Threats are not always inter-personal (i.e. between Agent A and Agent B)
but can also be posed by ‘the logic of the situation’ (Pennock : ).
For example, the recruitment for protection mechanism described
above is an example of a coercive recruitment mechanism because
pervasive insecurity pushes individuals into armed groups. This type of
recruitment is not forced at gunpoint, but neither is it entirely free of
duress. The same can be said for recruitment that occurs because of the
endogenous grievance mechanism mentioned above. It will be recalled
that this mechanism captures the idea that when combatants loot, rape
and kill civilians during ongoing war, new grievances are generated
and/or opportunity costs are driven down. In this latter scenario, there
is no inter-personal threat but the logic of the situation coerces
recruitment, particularly if civilians believe that the only way to restore
their normal lives is to either join the pillaging group or to ﬁght back
by enlisting in an opponent group.
In sum, if an individual is faced with an inter-personal threat of the
type ‘join or I’ll . . .’ and the sanction is severe enough to remove all
choice in the matter, then this type of recruitment can be considered
forced. If the sanction is relatively mild or posed by the logic of the
situation, this type of recruitment can be considered at least partially
coerced. Within a coercive setting, recruitment can be a mixture of
both coercion and voluntarism, the balance of which is determined
by the extent to which an individual emphasises his or her own agency
(i.e. ‘it was my decision’) over the constraints of the environment (‘I had
no choice’).
Finally, non-coercive or purely voluntary participation occurs
in the absence of both an inter-personal threat and a coercive
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environment. As I see it, individuals who join up because of the peer
pressure mechanism outlined in the ‘strong communities’ literature are
not coerced unless this type of social pressure is coupled with a threat of
harm for non-compliance. Additional forms of voluntary participation
occur when civilians enlist because of greed and/or low opportunity
costs, or because of a build-up of pre-existing grievances and resentment
(i.e. for emotional in-process beneﬁts).
R E S E A R C H I N G R E C R U I T M E N T I N T H E D R C : F I E L D M E T H O D S
In  and , I conducted interviews with  ex-combatants in
Goma and Sake in North Kivu Province. During these interviews I asked
open-ended questions about how and why the respondents had joined
armed groups. As many of these interviewees had fought in more
than one group I restricted the current analysis to ﬁrst-time recruitment
and selected interviewees ( in total) whose ﬁrst armed group
had been either RCD/RCD-Goma or a local defence (‘Mai-Mai’) militia.
The decision to contrast the Mai-Mai movement and RCD was based
on the fact that these actors had very different initial endowments, yet
both eventually resorted to force. In total I used interview transcripts
from  ﬁrst-time RCD/RCD-Goma recruits and  ﬁrst-time militia
ﬁghters: Mai-Mai Mongol (), Mai-Mai Simba (), Mai-Mai Jackson (),
Mai-Mai Kifuafua (), PARECO-Lafontaine (), APCLS (), Mai-Mai
Nyabiondo (), Mai-Mai Kasikila () and an unnamed Mai-Mai
group (). A list of the interviewees is provided in Appendix .
To outside researchers, ex-combatants are what sociologists call a
‘hidden population’, in that they often lack characteristics that dis-
tinguish them from the general population (Salganik & Heckathorn,
: ). To overcome this, I relied on a chain-referral technique or,
more simply put, introductions by individuals with insider knowledge.
These ‘insiders’ oversaw the management of ex-combatant associations,
training centres and reintegration projects. I was also sometimes
provided access to former combatants who did not participate in such
programmes by asking for direct referrals from interviewees.
Chain-referral generates a sample which is non-random and which
may contain biases which are then compounded through each wave of
referral. This may occur, for example, if respondents refer researchers to
friends with backgrounds and experiences which are similar to their own
(Cohen & Arieli : –). To counteract this I attempted to speak
to a wide variety of respondents in order to capture at least some of
the variation in recruitment experiences (Nussio : ). I also
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attempted to diversify the experiences of the interviewees by asking
for referrals from many different insiders. Although the resultant
sample is not necessarily representative, it is also not obviously biased
in terms of ethnicity, age, sex or former military rank. This is because
I interviewed Rwandophones and ‘native’ citizens, former child and
adult combatants, males and females, former rank and ﬁle combatants
and former junior commanders (i.e. captains, sergeants and lieute-
nants). The respondents also cited a range of motivations, and while
some argued that they were forced to join their armed groups, many
others did not.
Ex-combatants are sometimes considered unreliable sources of
information because their statements may be coloured by considerable
trauma, they may change their stories to present themselves as victims
rather than perpetrators (Utas ), or they may present overly
politicised accounts (Peters : ). To address this I tried, as other
researchers have, to build rapport with respondents through repeated
visits, to ask probing questions, and to corroborate, where possible, with
individuals who knew the respondent’s background and with additional
relevant literature.
To derive the conceptual framework distinguishing forced, coerced
and voluntary recruitment I went back and forth between the interview
transcripts, the existing recruitment literature and the literature on
coercion in order to inductively ‘code’ the transcripts (Saldana ).
Once this conceptual step was complete I then attempted to develop a
theory, discussed below, of why armed groups resort to force. To do this
I turned to the coded interview transcripts and the broader literature
on the DRC to put together a history of recruitment practices for the
Mai-Mai and RCD/RCD-Goma. I then compared these histories to
look for variables explaining why some groups used voluntary, coercive
and/or forced recruitment methods at different times.
U N D E R S T A N D I N G F O R C E D R E C R U I T M E N T : A T H E O R E T I C A L
F R A M E W O R K
In this section I propose a theoretical framework explaining the
resort to forced recruitment in terms of popular support, manpower
deﬁcits and accountability to local communities, government sponsors
and/or the international community. Table III summarises this
framework, indicating the primary recruitment mechanisms which
should be observed when a non-state armed group experiences
manpower deﬁcits.
 J O A N N E R I C H A R D S
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X14000044
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 08:36:04, subject to the Cambridge Core
The theoretical argument presented here begins from the premise
that ﬁghting in civil wars requires a constant supply of recruits to replace
deserters, the war-wounded and the deceased. More simply put, if
a military rout is to be avoided, armed groups need to bring in new
recruits to replace those lost. Initially, armed groups will try to attract
voluntary recruits by using their economic and/or social endowments in
order to appeal to individuals with greedy motives, low opportunity
costs, grievances, community ties and emotional reasons for partici-
pation (these are the voluntary mechanisms in Table II). However,
according to the theory I present here, popular support will affect the
propensity of volunteers to enlist. Indeed, where popular support for an
armed group is low, even economic endowments may not be sufﬁcient
to attract opportunist recruits to an armed group that is the source of
much resentment. Economic endowments may also contribute to the
generation of resentment if combatants are perceived merely as bandits
and thieves or as tools of a foreign sponsor.
Ceteris paribus, armed groups with little popular support will have more
trouble ﬁlling recruitment gaps with volunteers than will groups that
enjoy popular support. However, when manpower needs arise, force is
still likely to be employed by popular groups who have sources of logistic
and ﬁnancial support that do not emanate from local populations. This
is because armed groups with access to natural resources and/or
support from (foreign or domestic) government sponsors are likely to
be less accountable to local communities, especially when these
sponsors are unconcerned by the use of forcible recruitment practices
(Beber & Blattman ). The absence of international pressure to halt
forced recruitment may also lower accountability in a similar way.
In contrast, however, when armed groups are in fact accountable to
local communities, the international community and/or governmental
sponsors who condition support on the absence of forcible recruitment,
then the use of force is likely to be contingent on popular support
TA B L E I I I
Primary types of recruitment in the face of manpower deﬁcits
Accountability
High Low
Popular
support
High Voluntary, Coercive Voluntary, coercive, (force if other
mechanisms do not meet manpower gaps)
Low Covert force Overt force
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and manpower needs. As I discuss further below, for popular groups
with high accountability, manpower needs may be met by recruits
spurred by voluntary and coercive recruitment mechanisms, thus
reducing the need to resort to force. However, if manpower needs
arise when popular support is low and accountability is high, a lack of
voluntary and coerced recruits means that non-state armed groups may
have few other options than to use force, albeit in a covert manner.
As explained in the previous section, coercive recruitment can arise
when an occupying armed group loots and threatens civilians under
its control in order to lower their opportunity costs to participation
and to create a desire for protection. However, coercive recruitment
strategies are not always intended, and may simply be a by-product of the
grievances and insecurities created by ongoing war. A coercive
environment is likely to push civilians into the arms of groups with
popular support rather than those without, meaning that unpopular
groups with low accountability have greater incentives to resort to force.
This follows partly because coercion may drive civilians into the arms of
other (more popular) armed groups, but also because neither voluntary
nor coercive recruitment mechanisms will be sufﬁcient to ﬁll manpower
gaps. It should also be noted, however, that if an unpopular and
unaccountable armed group is not faced with recruitment deﬁcits,
combatants may opt to kill (rather than forcibly recruit) members
of communities that are perceived to be unsupportive.
L O C A L D E F E N C E M I L I T I A S
In , military commanders in local Mai-Mai defence militias
and traditional chiefs in the Kivu provinces collaborated to mobilise
volunteers to ﬁght against RCD. The goals of Mai-Mai commanders
and some traditional chiefs coalesced, as both sought to keep land and
positions of traditional authority out of the hands of the Rwandan-
backed rebellion which, as aforementioned, was often perceived as
a ‘Tutsi dominated occupation’ (Tull : , ).
Drawing on social endowments, and consistent with the ‘strong
communities’ theory of recruitment, commanders and chiefs sometimes
tried to persuade members of their communities to join the Mai-Mai. As
an illustration, a former member of Mai-Mai Mongol explained that
‘It was the traditional chiefs that pushed us to enrol and ﬁght for our
tribe’ (Interview , ..). Two former members of a Mai-Mai
militia in Nyabiondo (Masisi territory, North Kivu) who were recruited at
the beginning of the RCD rebellion also described how, ‘The superiors
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of the Mai-Mai addressed our chiefs who supported our movement, and
the chiefs sensitised young candidates for recruitment. When the Tutsi
started to attack the east of our country we enrolled in the Mai-Mai
to combat RCD. This was after we were sensitised by our customary
chiefs. We then decided freely to join the armed group’ (Interview ,
..).
Importantly however, former Mai-Mai combatants reported that
they also knew people in their villages who opted not to join the ﬁght
against RCD, and who were not forced to do so. Just as some families
supported and encouraged their children’s participation in local
defence militias, others actively tried to prevent their children’s
enrolment. As a former member of Mai-Mai Kifuafua reported, ‘I had
a friend who was a blacksmith who stayed in civilian life. He was also
troubled by the uneasy peace but his family prevented him from coming
to ﬁght with Kifuafua’ (Interview , ..). A former corporal in
the Mai-Mai Kasikila militia also explained that, ‘Each person who
couldn’t stand the presence of the Banyarwanda enrolled. The ones
who did not want to stayed quietly in the village. I had some friends
who stayed. They were afraid of combat and of being killed. I did
not have fear, because I wanted to avenge the death of my brother’
(Interview , ..).
Owing to the high level of popular support for the Mai-Mai, voluntary
recruitment occurred and Mai-Mai militias did not initially resort
to force. The coercive logic of the ongoing war also drove non-Tutsi
civilians into the Mai-Mai for protection. As illustration, some
former militia ﬁghters reported that they joined up upon hearing that
RCD-Goma was attempting to take control of their neighbourhood or
village, and also because they heard rumours of forced recruitment
drives. As a former member of Mai-Mai Jackson, recruited during the
war against RCD-Goma, remembered: ‘At home [in Nyanzale, Rutshuru
territory] there was the Mai-Mai which fought the Tutsi . . . I joined
Mai-Mai Jackson when the Tutsi came to our villages. They said that the
young men were Mai-Mai, and even if we weren’t, they were going to kill
us anyway’ (Interview , ..). Another former Mai-Mai member
provided a similar explanation: ‘[I joined] because of the massacres by
the Tutsi in the villages. We saw the threats to our population and us,
the youth, took the decision to take up arms and join the Mai-Mai.
We found the one with the most dawa [magic] to protect us’ (Interview
, ..).
Endogenously created grievances and/or lowered opportunity
costs also prompted coerced recruitment, and strong community
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mechanisms such as peer-pressure seem to have had particular
resonance in such coercive environments. For example, a former
lieutenant in Mai-Mai Mongol explained that he decided to ﬁght against
RCD-Goma because his work was disrupted and also because his chiefs
asked community members to participate: ‘Our chiefs asked that each
family with three children delegate at least one young male. It was
necessary to combat our enemies. So, I decided to sacriﬁce myself in the
name of my family, because I could no longer work in my ﬁeld’
(Interview , ..). Emotional in-process beneﬁts of partici-
pation also combined with endogenous grievances and/or lowered
opportunity costs, including for those who lived under the control of the
unpopular RCD. Resentment against the ‘occupiers’ ran high and was
bolstered by the fact that the rebels disrupted livelihoods in their zones
by forcibly closing some local businesses and imposing taxes on others
(UN  para –). As a former member of Mai-Mai Kifuafua
explained, ‘The people were maltreated by the RCD soldiers. We had in
mind the defence of our country because we were traumatised by the
exactions of RCD. By pride we decided to defend ourselves’ (Interview ,
..). More generally, ‘Tunaﬁa nchi yetu’ (‘we die for our country’)
was the patriotic and emotive rallying cry of the Mai-Mai in the ﬁght
against RCD-Goma (IRIN ).
It should be noted that despite the prevalence of community and
coercive recruitment mechanisms, greedy motivations were not entirely
absent and served to encourage at least some voluntary recruitment into
Mai-Mai groups (Van Acker & Vlassenroot : ). In , support
from Kinshasa meant that Mai-Mai militias were able to switch from hit-
and-run tactics to the occupation of territory, including territory rich in
natural resources (Van Acker & Vlassenroot : ). In these zones,
local Mai-Mai militias taxed individuals working in resource extraction,
such as coltan diggers in Masisi territory, in return for ‘protection’
(Global Witness : ). The introduction of economic endowments
prompted at least some recruitment which was simultaneously oppor-
tunistic but also security-seeking. As a former corporal in Mai-Mai Simba
explained, ‘I was unemployed and my parents were poor. There was no
security [in Walikale] because of the militias and rebels of all origins
who invaded and stayed in the area because of the minerals and mines.
The difﬁculties of life pushed me to enrol. I thought I would have a part
of the mines, the gold, the diamonds, but I had nothing at all’ (Interview
, ..).
Over time, the introduction of economic endowments helped
to contribute to the growing perception among some civilians that
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Mai-Mai combatants were becoming simple bandits and thieves.
Indeed, by , six years after the onset of the RCD rebellion, the
Mai-Mai movement had experienced a notable drop in public
support (Jourdan : ; CSUCS : ). Added to this, the
perception of Mai-Mai invulnerability to bullets – and therefore the
idea that these groups could provide protection – had also begun
to wane. As one civilian remarked in December , ‘once they
did not die, but now they have started to die as all the others’ (Jourdan
: ).
Coupled with this drop in popular support throughout the RCD war,
the Mai-Mai’s access to natural resources, increased backing from the
DRC government and the movement of Mai-Mai groups outside their
communities of origin all contributed to a decline in accountability
(IRIN ). While the recruitment of children (forced or otherwise) is
prohibited by a number of national laws in the DRC, including the
 Labour Code and the  Defence and Armed Forces Law
No. /, there has been a lack of political will to implement these
laws and a lack of institutional capacity to enforce them (CSUCS :
). Furthermore, Mai-Mai commanders known to have forcibly
recruited children have subsequently taken up positions within the
national army, free from sanctions (CSUCS : ). This enabling
environment where accountability to the DRC government, to local
communities, and to the international community was low meant that
over time, as manpower needs arose and as popular support declined,
Mai-Mai militias resorted to force.
As illustration, large-scale forced recruitment by Mai-Mai groups was
observed by the time that these groups re-emerged to ﬁght RCD-Goma’s
successor group, CNDP, in . As a former member of PARECO-
Lafontaine (a coalition of Mai-Mai groups ﬁghting CNDP) explained,
‘We recruited each day. We had a need for new soldiers, so we rounded
up youth, ﬁrst to make them porters who would then become
combatants. We fought each day so there were many deaths and
injuries, we needed to replace them’ (Interview , ..). United
Nations reports corroborate these assertions, reporting that recruitment
drives by local Mai-Mai militias often coincided with periods of battle
between the Mai-Mai and CNDP in – (UN ; CSUCS : ).
A former member of APCLS, a predominantly Hunde militia which
emerged as a splinter from PARECO-Lafontaine provided a similar
story: ‘In general, we did not force people, but as soon as the number of
effectives diminished through combat we took the young by force’
(Interview , ..). In a similar manner, forced recruitment
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seems to have occurred when extra numbers were needed prior to
impending battles. A former member of PARECO-Lafontaine described
how, ‘When we were going on mission, we picked up twenty people to
carry our bags. The youngest of them we kept and gave them weapons.
The eldest we sent home. We recruited especially during our military
operations. We entered homes and took young people by force’
(Interview , ..). A former ofﬁcer from PARECO-Lafontaine,
who was involved in recruitment, provided a similar explanation:
‘When we were going to the front we picked up youth who were going
to school. This is how I was recruited’ (Interview , ..).
T H E R C D R E B E L L I O N
The Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD) rebel group
emerged two years after the  Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la
Libération du Congo (AFDL) rebellion. Not only did RCD lack popular
support from non-Rwandophone communities but it also faced a hostile
population tired of war (Tull : ). What RCD lacked in popular
support, however, it made up for in economic endowments. Initially,
Rwandan, Ugandan, Burundian and/or Congolese soldiers within RCD
drained stockpiles of minerals and agricultural and forest products
from eastern DRC (UN : para ). Following the exhaustion of
these stores, RCD turned to extraction and advertised coltan trading as
soon as it assumed control over the areas previously controlled by AFDL
(Montague : ).
In common with the recruitment tactics used by the Mai-Mai,
RCD-Goma attempted to encourage voluntary recruitment among the
population under its control by embarking on sensitisation campaigns.
Rebel representatives issued radio broadcasts encouraging parents to
send their children to the regular RCD-Goma army or to RCD-Goma’s
auxiliary ‘Local Defence Forces.’ The Local Defence Forces were small
bands of individuals who received minimal military training and who
were tasked with protecting their community from Mai-Mai attacks
(HRW : ). These groups were introduced by RCD to overcome
the reluctance of the local population to join its ranks and also to
increase the rebellion’s internal legitimacy. Recruitment into the
Local Defence Forces was often followed by transfer into the regular
(or full-time) RCD-Goma army.
In contrast to the voluntary recruitment into the Mai-Mai militias,
‘strong community’ mechanisms of peer-pressure and peer-assurance
did not yield large numbers of voluntary recruits for RCD. Instead, RCD’s
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reliance on foreign governments and linkages to international
markets contributed to local perceptions of the rebels as foreign
occupiers uninterested in local communities (Mampilly : ).
Similarly, ready access to economic endowments meant that the rebels
had little incentive to mobilise popular support through the provision of
services, preferring instead to concentrate their resources on military
engagements (Mampilly : ).
In consequence, civilians within the Kivu provinces often did
not volunteer, but instead, attempted to actively resist enrolment
(Tull : ). In December , for example, a resident of Masisi
territory in North Kivu province commented ‘They [RCD-Goma] say that
everyone from  to  should be in the army. “Why?” we ask. We don’t
know the point of this war’ (HRW : ). Another Goma resident
stated similarly, ‘We know that there is no-one who would go voluntarily.
Now when they come to persuade us to let one of our sons go to the
army, the ﬁrst question the parents ask is where are the sons we already
gave you? And who are you ﬁghting against and why?’ (HRW : ).
This is not to say that no civilians or traditional chiefs enrolled for
opportunistic reasons, although this type of voluntary recruitment does
seem to have been relatively rare considering the abundance of RCD’s
economic endowments. Some former RCD combatants reported that
they joined in order to support their families, and because of pre-existing
grievances and low opportunity costs: ‘I am the eldest. My father is dead
and so I am the head of the family, but I couldn’t manage to look after
my two younger brothers and sister. That’s why I enrolled in RCD-Goma’
(AI : ). A former child soldier in RCD-Goma also reported that
he enlisted owing to a peer-assurance mechanism: ‘I joined because
there were many children already there’ (AI : ).
The dearth of voluntary recruits was also compounded by the fact
that, as observed in the previous section on militia recruitment, coercive
recruitment mechanisms (including protection but also endogenous
grievances and/or lowered opportunity costs) tended to push many
non-Tutsi civilians into the arms of popular Mai-Mai militias rather
than the resented RCD. Some, however, did enlist in RCD-Goma in the
hope of protecting themselves against accusations that they were
Mai-Mai supporters. This was done in the knowledge that association
with the enemy would bring forth punishment. As one female former
RCD-Goma combatant explained,
I was living in my village with my mother and my brothers and sisters.
One day, our village was attacked by the Mai-Mai. The Mai-Mai soldiers
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stole everything we had. A few days later, our village was attacked again
by RCD-Goma, who accused us of collaboration with the Mai-Mai and of
giving them food. I watched as soldiers killed many of my relatives in the
village and rapedmy two sisters and my mother. I was hiding . . . I was scared,
and I thought that if I joined the army, I would be protected. I wanted
to defend myself. (AI : –)
Another more succinctly stated that she joined RCD-Goma because she
‘did not want to be mistaken for a Mai-Mai’ (Interview , ..).
Unable to encourage large-scale voluntary recruitment and with little
popular support to lose, RCD-Goma resorted to more coercive tactics
and eventually, forcible conscription. As a former RCD-Goma comba-
tant who initially resisted RCD’s sensitisation campaigns explained,
The Rwandans came and said ‘you the Congolese work with us to chase
our enemies [i.e. the Interahamwe, and ex-FAR] who are in the DRC and
make them return to Rwanda’. At this time, I was  years old and I refused
to join them but then they used their military orders and they took me by
force. Those who tried to refuse were put in prison, or their families were
harassed. (Interview , ..)
A former RCD instructor also explained how, ‘I was sent to certain zones
to recruit people for the RCD army. Because no-one would volunteer,
the RCD forced people’ (HRW : ).
Forced recruitment was undertaken not only because of low levels
of popular support and voluntary recruitment, but also because RCD
increasingly needed new troops to ﬁll manpower gaps. In particular,
following the July  Lusaka peace agreement, it was agreed that
the Rwandan army troops, which made up a considerable portion of
RCD-Goma’s ground forces, were to withdraw from the DRC. As these
withdrawals began, RCD-Goma found itself in a militarily vulnerable
position, in part because of its previous reliance on Rwandan forces
but also because of the large amount of territory over which it sought
to maintain control, and which was actively contested by Mai-Mai groups
(AI : –). As new Mai-Mai offensives commenced, RCD-Goma
began a forced recruitment drive that aimed to remedy these new
manpower deﬁcits.
To illustrate, during a forced recruitment drive conducted by
RCD-Goma in November , one Goma resident described how
‘They didn’t ﬁnd enough youth to come forward voluntarily so they
had to do it by force’ (HRW : ). Another stated in December
, ‘the war is not succeeding. They [RCD-Goma] need numbers
at the front. They say it is being done voluntarily but if you
refuse you are considered hostile to the RCD and are the enemy’
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(HRW : ). Reports indicate that as RCD-Goma’s forced re-
cruitment campaign was underway in late , young men in
Goma were loaded into trucks and taken away to ﬁght whereas
others were picked up at Kituku market (HRW : ). Many of
the former RCD-Goma soldiers whom I interviewed also recounted
their experiences of individual and mass forced recruitment. As one
recalled,
I joined in the era when they [RCD-Goma] took youths in the street to
enrol them. I was taken by force on the return from school. RCD
sent soldiers who encircled and took the young in their neighbourhoods
and in their villages and brought them into the forest. It was the epoch
when Laurent Nkunda [then serving with RCD] took the young by
force. We were rounded up and forced to work with RCD until we had
an occasion to quit the group . . . We did not have a choice. (Interview ,
..)
Furthermore, just as Mai-Mai militias forcibly recruited on their way
to combat in order to bolster numbers for battle, so too did RCD-
Goma. Civilians were initially forced to carry the group’s equipment
and supplies before being forcibly enlisted. As a former member of
RCD-Goma explained: ‘Before entering RCD, I was a baggage porter
for the soldiers. We had no choice and we were threatened with beatings
or torture if we refused’ (Interview , ..).
Initially a combination of low popular support, a dearth of voluntary
and/or coerced recruits, and large recruitment deﬁcits prompted RCD-
Goma’s resort to forced recruitment. However, as condemnation of the
group’s forced recruitment drives grew, the rebel group changed tack
slightly. RCD-Goma was concerned by international perceptions of the
group and often tried to avoid perpetrating violence openly in urban
areas under its control, where word was likely to get out (Mampilly :
). Furthermore, owing to the presence of international agencies in
the urban centres of Goma, Bukavu and Uvira, RCD-Goma curtailed
forcible recruitment in these areas, focusing instead on outlying rural
zones where force could be used in a more covert manner (AI :
). These rural zones included the less monitored areas of Shabunda,
Mwenga, Fizi and Idjwi (all in South Kivu), Masisi, Walikale and
Rutshuru (all in North Kivu), and ﬁnally, the Kindu and Punia
territories of Maniema province (AI : ). Anecdotal evidence
also suggests that, in an attempt to make up for the absence of forced
recruits in urban areas, RCD-Goma switched to the alternative strategy of
promising pecuniary incentives to urbanites in return for voluntary
enlistment (HRW : ).
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C O N C L U S I O N
In this paper I have conceptualised forced, coerced and voluntary
recruitment and provided a theoretical framework explaining the use
of these different recruitment strategies in the DRC. The framework
highlights that overt forced recruitment is most likely to occur when
armed groups experience manpower deﬁcits and when accountability
is low. High popular support may reduce (although not necessarily
eliminate) the use of force under these conditions because popular
groups should be better able to plug manpower deﬁcits with volunteers
and coerced recruits than unpopular groups, ceteris paribus. These
theoretical relationships are also potentially applicable outside of the
DRC. For example, the RENAMO rebel group in Mozambique forcibly
recruited in areas of popular support when extra combatants
were needed and accountability was absent (Weinstein : ). Ex-
combatants from the rebel group Liberians United for Reconciliation
and Democracy have also stated that forcible recruitment was used
because ‘after Lofa Country came under [our] control we needed more
people to do further advances’ (Wille : ).
Ultimately, if a non-state armed group ﬁnds itself low on numbers with
its survival at stake, it seems unlikely that international pressure on
armed groups and their sponsors will be able to increase accountability
and halt forcible recruitment drives completely (Mack : ).
However, international pressure, attention and monitoring may be able
to curtail the worst excesses by making overt and particularly rampant
forcible recruitment drives more difﬁcult to conduct. Furthermore,
international restrictions on trade in natural resources from conﬂict
zones and tougher measures against (foreign) governments backing
non-state armed groups may also help to increase (or at least sustain)
reliance on and accountability to local communities, thereby reducing
the resort to force. It should be noted, however, that in order to ﬁll
manpower deﬁcits, armed groups may then more actively pursue
alternative avenues in order to increase their numbers of voluntary
and coerced recruits.
N O T E S
. Banyarwanda means ‘those from Rwanda’ and is now associated with Rwandophones from
North Kivu.
. Recruitment for protection was cited by both female and male interviewees even though rape
occurred within armed groups. Whether female combatants were better able to protect themselves
against rape than non-combatants was outside the scope of this research.
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A P P E N D I X  : I N T E R V I E W E E S
Mai-Mai militias Date of interview Rank
Mongol .. Escort (child soldier)
Mongol ..,
..
Colonel (child soldier)
Mongol .. – (child soldier)
Mongol .. Lieutenant (child soldier)
Simba .. Captain
Simba .. Corporal
Simba .. Captain
Simba .. –
Simba .. Corporal
Jackson .. Corporal
Jackson .. Corporal (child soldier)
Kifuafua .. Sergeant
Kifuafua .. Corporal (child soldier)
Kifuafua .. –
Kifuafua .. Lieutenant
Kifuafua .. Sergeant
Kifuafua .. Secretary
Kifuafua .. Soldier
PARECO-Lafontaine .. First-Lieutenant
PARECO-Lafontaine .. Captain
PARECO-Lafontaine .. –
PARECO-Lafontaine .. –
PARECO-Lafontaine .. S ofﬁcer (child soldier)
PARECO-Lafontaine .. Platoon chief
PARECO-Lafontaine .. Captain
PARECO-Lafontaine .. Sub-Lieutenant (child soldier)
PARECO-Lafontaine .. S ofﬁcer (child soldier)
PARECO-Lafontaine .. Lieutenant-Colonel
PARECO-Lafontaine .. Adjutant
PARECO-Lafontaine .. – (child soldier)
APCLS .. Escort/Corporal (child soldier)
APCLS (female) .. Escort/Corporal (child soldier)
APCLS .. Adjutant (child soldier)
APCLS .. –
APCLS .. –
APCLS .. – (child soldier)
APCLS .. – (child soldier)
Nyabiondo .. Soldier (child soldier)
Nyabiondo .. Premier-Sergeant
Kasikila .. Corporal (child soldier)
Miscellaneous .. – (child soldier)
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Rebel group Date of interview Rank
RCD-Goma .. Captain
RCD-Goma .. Soldier
RCD-Goma .. Private (child soldier)
RCD-Goma .. Sergeant
RCD-Goma .. Soldier
RCD-Goma .. Soldier (child soldier)
RCD-Goma (female) .. Sub-Lieutenant
RCD-Goma (female) .. Sergeant
RCD-Goma .. Adjutant chief (child soldier)
RCD-Goma .. –
RCD-Goma .. – (child soldier)
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